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Abstract
The increasing amount of personal and sensitive information disseminated over the Internet prompts
commensurately growing privacy concerns. Digital data often lingers indefinitely and users lose its control.
This motivates the desire to restrict content availability to an expiration time set by the data owner. This
paper presents and formalizes the notion of Ephemeral Publishing (EphPub), to prevent the access to expired
content. We propose an efficient and robust protocol that builds on the Domain Name System (DNS) and
its caching mechanism. With EphPub, sensitive content is published encrypted and the key material is
distributed, in a steganographic manner, to randomly selected and independent resolvers. The availability
of content is then limited by the evanescence of DNS cache entries. The EphPub protocol is transparent to
existing applications, and does not rely on trusted hardware, centralized servers, or user proactive actions.
We analyze its robustness and show that it incurs a negligible overhead on the DNS infrastructure. We
also perform a large-scale study of the caching behavior of 900K open DNS resolvers. Finally, we propose
Firefox and Thunderbird extensions that provide ephemeral publishing capabilities, as well as a command-
line tool to create ephemeral files.
1 Introduction
As the amount of private information disseminated over the Internet increases, so do related privacy con-
cerns. Private data is increasingly often cached, stored, or archived, in the cloud and, in numerous occasions, its
ownership is lost. Users are often unable to successfully delete published content: for instance, social network
providers maintain daily backup tapes and do not physically erase “deleted” content from all backups [14],
ascribing to the expensiveness of this operation. As a result, everlasting information may endanger user privacy
and become a prey of subpoena, government surveillance, or data leaks. For instance, a college student may up-
load (e.g., on a social network) pictures where she/he and her/his friends are evidently drunk; even after years,
pictures may regrettably re-surface, e.g., during job hunting. Similarly, a blogger may post some controversial
messages, which can later compromise an election campaign or even personal safety. In essence, if private data
is perpetually available, then the threat for user privacy becomes permanent.
One natural step toward enhancing privacy is ensuring data confidentiality, i.e., by encrypting sensitive
content. However, besides the well-known key-distribution problem, this approach faces some challenges: (1)
privacy is lost if cleartext copies of the sensitive content or the decryption keys are leaked, and (2) access cannot
be revoked. In particular key holders who had little interest in the data at the time of distribution can later decide
to use the key to access the data at any future time. Consider, for example, a friend that has become an enemy,
an employer that wants to dig through an employee’s past data, or subpoenas for old records. Unfortunately,
not much can be done with respect to the first problem where content or keys that are leaked or redistributed.
∗An earlier version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of IEEE ICNP 2011.
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In this paper we address the later problem; namely the problem of revoking encryption keys from key holders
who try to access the data after some future expiration time set by the user.
Our approach, called Ephemeral Publishing (EphPub), not only encrypts content, but also uses a key escrow
mechanism that ensures a keys automatic erasure, after an expiration time set by the user. Our approach is
similar to the concept explored by Vanish [17], where key shares are distributed on a Distributed Hash Table
(DHT). Since peers store data only for a limited period of time, so called churn, key shares are eventually
erased. However, DHTs are vulnerable to Sybil attacks [11]. It has been shown by Wolchok et. al. [32] that,
at a reasonable cost, an attacker can collect the keys distributed over the DHT. As we will show, EphPub uses
a novel key distribution mechanism based on the DNS system that avoids such attacks and also improves the
usability and availability of the system.
The notion of Ephemeral Publishing is useful, for instance, in the following scenarios:
• Online Social Networks (OSNs): Content published on online social networks—such as pictures or wall
posts—has often time-limited value to the users. As reported by [8], users would often like to delete their
content after a small period of time (e.g., a few hours or days). However, deletion is not always effective,
as data is often cached without users’ knowledge by the service provider [6]. In contrast, EphPub lets
a user publish encrypted content and ensures that intended recipients (e.g., OSN friends) can access
decryption keys – hence, content – only within a specific period of time, assuming the OSN friend has
not cached the decryption key for future use. While EphPub cannot prevent OSN friends from caching
content or decryption keys for future access to the data, it can prevent friends from viewing data in the
future if they did not cache the key or the content (e.g., they had no interest in the data at the time and did
not access the content or key)1.
• Outsourced Data: Web users increasingly outsource personal and confidential data to the cloud, e.g.,
using backup services, such as Dropbox. Such private data must be stored in an encrypted form to prevent
access by the service provider (e.g., for data mining purposes or in response to a subpoena). However,
encryption would not be effective unless all the users of the data proactively delete the decryption keys
since the keys may be subject to subpoena. Note that in this case we assume there is no risk of leaks or
redistribution because all users want to keep the data private. However, it requires all users to remember to
delete the decryption keys they have been given. EphPub addresses this issue by distributing information
that allows users to retrieve the key online. This information does not need to be deleted because it
becomes useless after a fixed amount of time.
A naı¨ve solution for the EphPub problem would be to publish encrypted content and store the corresponding
encryption keys on a server that she owns so that the keys can be deleted when the content’s lifetime expires.
However, this solution requires keys to be constantly accessible (thus, introducing a single point of failure), and
raises additional privacy concerns as the publisher can always trace users accessing her content.
Technical Roadmap. In this paper we present Ephemeral Publishing (EphPub), a protocol aimed at guarantee-
ing retroactive privacy [17], i.e., allowing users to set an expiration time on their information and preventing
an adversary from retrieving messages after expiration. EphPub leverages a fully-distributed and ubiquitous
Internet service: the Domain Name System (DNS). We exploit its caching mechanism, as DNS resolvers cache
the response to a recursive DNS query for potential further requests. These cache entries are kept for a fixed
period of time, i.e., the record’s TTL (Time To Live). Once the TTL has expired, the resolver erases the record
from its cache. We implement encryption keys as ephemeral keys. Each key is composed of ephemeral bits,
i.e., it is divided into single bits that independently become inaccessible after a period of time.
Ephemeral Bits. To set an ephemeral bit to 1, a recursive DNS query for an existing domain name is performed
to a DNS resolver. This resolver caches the response for as long as the domain’s TTL permits. Whereas, to
1 Our implementation of EphPub never caches unencrypted keys or content, which means users cannot access the content after the key
expires.
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set an ephemeral bit to 0, no DNS request is performed. An ephemeral bit is thereafter coded by the domain
name and the resolver address. Before the TTL expires, one can retrieve the ephemeral bit with a non-recursive
DNS query: if the resolver answers the query (i.e., an entry in its cache exists) then the bit 1 is read, otherwise
if no response is returned the bit 0 is read. We use domain names selected at random, so that they have a
negligible probability to be queried by entities external to the system. To deal with events that may generate
faulty bits (DNS churn, connectivity problems, caching implementations, policies issues, failures, etc.), we use
a Reed-Solomon error correction code [27].
Contributions. This paper formalizes the notion of Ephemeral Publishing (EphPub), by defining requirements,
adversarial capabilities, and privacy goals. Then, it presents a practical and robust protocol that uses the DNS
and its caching mechanism. Our solution has several strong points compared to related work (e.g., Vanish [17]):
besides being immune to Sybil attacks, (1) it allows users to set data expiration times with finer granularity (in
Vanish it is bounded to DHT churn, typically 8 hours); (2) it does not require any additional infrastructure (e.g., a
DHT or trusted servers); (3) it is lightweight, and does not force users to install extra software (e.g., DHT client),
thus, it can be deployed on smartphones. Further, we propose two prototype implementations: a command-line
tool to create files that can be decrypted only before expiration time, and a stand-alone Firefox and Thunderbird
extension that makes any web text ephemeral. Source code is available at http://code.google.com/p/
ephpub/. Finally, in the process of designing our EphPub solution, we analyze the behavior of DNS cache
resolvers: our measurements show that, from a dataset of 225K resolvers, 10% behave as recommended by the
IETF. We stress that the goal of EphPub is to protect information privacy against third-party service providers,
government surveillance, and future subpoena. EphPub is not designed to safeguard published content from
targeted attacks, e.g., within content’s lifetime. It does not provide a DRM-like mechanism that prohibits
recipients from copying or republishing content, before expiration time. In other words, aiming at preventing
data access after expiration time, EphPub proposes a new automated technique (i.e., without user proactive
intervention) geared for time-bounded content.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define system model,
requirements, and privacy properties. Then, we describe the EphPub protocol in Section 3 and analyze its secu-
rity in Section 4. Next, Section 5 presents the details of our prototype implementations, Section 6 presents our
extensive experimental analysis, and Section 7 overviews relevant related work. Finally, Section 8 concludes
the paper and discusses future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we model system assumptions and requirements. Finally, we present adversarial models and
our formal definition of retroactive privacy.
System Model. An Ephemeral Publishing (EphPub) system involves a sender, S, and one or more receivers.
For ease of discussion, and without loss of generality, in the rest of the paper, we assume a single receiver
R. S sends to R time-bounded messages M . A message M is time-bounded if it can only be read for a
given period of time specified by S, that we denote with Tv. We denote with t the time at which the validity
of the message starts, e.g., when the sender posts the message. Thus, the “life cycle” of M starts at t and
ends at tv = t + Tv. EphPub also involves an encoding function Encode(·, ·). Specifically, Encode(M, tv)
denotes the encoding of time-bounded message M as a function of M itself and the expiration time tv. This
is the information that is actually exchanged between S and R. The function Decode(·) denotes the inverse
operation, i.e., Decode(Encode(M, tv)) =M .
System Requirements. We require that a practical and robust Ephemeral Publishing (EphPub) protocol meets
the following minimum requirements. Specifically, it should:
1. Guarantee retroactive privacy, which we define under two different adversarial models (below).
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2. Work for synchronous and asynchronous communications. The sender and receiver could have intermit-
tent connectivity and do not need to be connected at the same time. In particular, the sender and receiver
could be turned off at anytime in [t; tv].
3. Rely only on existing primary services, and not on yet-to-be deployed services or infrastructure. In
addition, to avoid single points of failure or trust, it should not depend on centralized services or require
the existence of specific hardware or devices, such as a TPM (Trusted Platform Module).
Assumptions. We rely on the following assumptions. (i) S and R securely erase the plaintext message M or
key material from their local storage. (ii) Messages are only stored or transmitted encrypted. (iii) S and R
know the expiration time tv.
Retroactive Privacy against a Weak Adversary. A weak adversary (W-ADV) has access to the same primi-
tives and services as any user S andR. She can inject, alter, and replay any message between S andR. Besides,
after message expiration time, W-ADV may have full access to S and R’s internal memory. Further, we assume
that W-ADV does not have access to Encode(M, tv) before expiration time tv, i.e., she does not obtain infor-
mation exchanged between S and R.
Formally, we say that EphPub is retroactive-private against a weak adversary if any efficient weak ad-
versary W-ADV can win the following game with probability non-negligibly over 1/2. The game is between
W-ADV and a two-sided challenger Ch = (ChS , ChR):
1. W-ADV announces two equal-length messages M0,M1, validity starting time t and expiration time tv =
t+ Tv.
2. At time t, Ch randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, computes Encode(Mb, tv), and transfers it from ChS to
ChR according to EphPub.
3. W-ADV may inject, replay, and modify messages in the communication between ChS , ChR.
4. After time tv, W-ADV accesses Encode(Mb, tv).
5. W-ADV outputs b′ (and wins if b′ = b).
An example of such adversarial setting is an investigation authority wishing to obtain emails previously sent
or received by a user, e.g., Alice. The authority may obtain a court order to seize Alice’s PC, as well as to
subpoena emails stored by Alice’s email provider. That is, even if email messages were encrypted, the authority
may obtain the related keys. However, the authority is assumed not to (constantly) monitor the communication
channel used to exchange emails.
Retroactive Privacy against a Strong Adversary. A strong adversary (S-ADV) has the same capabilities as
a weak adversary. Additionally, S-ADV may have access to Encode(M, tv) at any time. In other words, she
may eavesdrop all information exchanged between S and R.
Formally, we say that EphPub is retroactive-private against a strong adversary if any efficient strong ad-
versary S-ADV can win the following game with probability non-negligibly over 1/2. The game is between
S-ADV and a two-sided challenger Ch = (ChS , ChR):
1,2. Same as above.
3. S-ADV may eavesdrop, inject, replay, and modify messages in the communication between ChS , ChR.
4. At any time, S-ADV accesses Encode(Mb, tv).
5. Same as above.
4
An example of this stronger adversarial setting is a company concerned with behavior of one of its employees,
e.g., Bob. The company may obtain his emails from the internal mail server and seize Bob’s PC, but it may also
log all traffic in corporate network.
3 The EphPub Protocol
In this section, we describe our EphPub construction, which relies on DNS caching. Our intuition is as
follows. A user S wants to send a message to user R with validity period Tv: S encrypts the message using
a key k, so that the key is accessible only within the validity period. Each bit of the key is distributed on
separate DNS cache resolvers. Entries in the DNS cache expire according to their Time-To-Live (TTL), thus,
the encryption key can no longer be recovered.
3.1 Building Blocks
DNS Caching. DNS Caching allows to reduce the load on individual DNS resolvers [23]. After a successful
name resolution (following a DNS query), the DNS resolver keeps the record in cache for the time specified
in the record’s Time-To-Live (TTL) value (in seconds). This speeds-up responses to subsequent queries, since
these will be answered directly from the cache, without any other query. The TTL is defined by the domain
administrator for each authoritative DNS record. Typical values of the TTL are from 1 to 5 days, but this period
may vary from seconds to weeks [3]. We will present the results of our own measurements in Section 6.
Open DNS Resolvers. The Internet features a large number of open DNS resolvers2 – devices that respond
to DNS queries on port 53. EphPub relies on open DNS resolvers allowing recursive queries and performing
caching. In the rest of the paper, we denote them as DNS cache resolvers. During our experiments, we collected
900,000 open DNS resolvers’ IP addresses scanning arbitrary address ranges. Our study reveals that more than
10% of the identified open DNS resolvers perform caching properly. As Dagon et al. [7] estimated the number
of open recursive DNS resolvers to 17 million, we could estimate the number of open DNS cache resolvers to
1.7 million. For additional measurement studies on the DNS, we refer to [20, 30].
3.2 Ephemeral Bits
We now describe how EphPub encodes ephemeral bits: the existence (resp., the absence) of a record in
a particular resolver’s cache is associated to the bit 1 (resp., 0). To store an ephemeral bit 1, S performs a
recursive DNS request of an existing domain name, dname, to a DNS cache resolver, res. The resolver replies
with the domain’s record and caches the response for a period of time corresponding to domain’s TTL3. Hence,
the existence of an entry in the cache for a given domain name is interpreted as a bit 1. Whereas, a non-existing
entry is considered as a bit 0. At time t, S can transfer the bit 1 to R by sending the triplet {dname, res, tv}
(being tv = t+Tv). To store an ephemeral bit 0, S sends the same triplet toR without performing any recursive
DNS request. To read the bit R performs a non-recursive DNS request of the domain name dname to res. If
dname is in the cache, res replies with the corresponding entry and the bit is read as 1. If the entry is not in
the cache the bit reads as 0.
If a DNS request is performed once tv has passed, res will reply with an empty record, i.e., the bit will read
as 0 independently of its original value.
2A DNS resolver is open if it provides resolution for clients outside of its administrative domain. This is not to be confused with the
OpenDNS company.
3To ease exposition, we assume for now that TTL is equal to the desired validity period, Tv .
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Figure 1: EphPub Key Distribution.
3.3 Protocol Description
We now extend our approach to implement ephemeral bits to distribute (resp., retrieve) an entire encryption
(resp., decryption) key.
Message Encryption. First, the sender selects a random n-bit key k, for a semantically secure cipher, such as
AES. ki denotes the i-th bit of the key. Then, the sender encrypts a message M , under key k, and produces the
corresponding ciphertext, CT .
Key Distribution. The distribution of ephemeral key bits over DNS cache resolvers is illustrated in Figure 1.
Note that this instantiates the Encode(·, ·) function introduced in Section 2. The sender S generates Rs =
{res1, . . . , resn}, a list of n random (different) DNS cache resolvers, and Dn = {dname1, . . . , dnamen},
a list of n random valid domain names that have a TTL significantly close to Tv. Each domain dnamei is
selected as follows: S first picks a candidate dnamei at random from a (precomputed) list of domains with the
related TTL; then, it verifies if dnamei is already in the cache of resi, through a non-recursive DNS request of
dnamei. If resi replies with a valid record, dnamei is discarded, otherwise it is added to Dn.
Note that the list of random domains is precomputed and distributed to users. Specifically, we generate
a random IP address, execute its reverse lookup, and check whether the corresponding domain name had a
satisfactory TTL4. Next, for each bit ki of the key such that ki = 1, S performs a recursive DNS request of the
domain name dnamei to the DNS cache resolver resi. Consequently, the resolver resolves the domain name,
replies to the sender, and populates its cache with the corresponding record.
EphPub Object. The sender S builds the EphPub Object (EPO), defined as the output of the Encode(·, ·)
function, introduced in Section 2 and instantiated above. Thus, we define EPO(M, tv) = {CT,Rs,Dn, tv},
i.e., the EPO is composed of the ciphertext (CT ), the list of DNS cache resolvers (Rs), selected domain names
(Dn), and content expiration time, defined as tv = t + Tv. The ciphertext is the result of the encryption of
message M using an ephemeral key whose bits are distributed over DNS cache resolvers (res1, · · · , resn) by
querying domains (dname1, · · · , dnamen), respectively.
Key Retrieval. Upon reception of the EPO, i.e., EPO(M, tv) = {CT,Rs,Dn, tv}, the receiver checks
whether the current time is smaller than tv. If this is the case, she reconstructs the key k′ as follows. The
retrieval of key bits from DNS cache resolver (at a time t+ d, s.t. t+ d < tv) is also illustrated in Figure 2. For
each domain name dnamei, (i ∈ 1, n), the receiver performs a non-recursive request to the DNS cache resolver
resi. If resi replies with a valid record, then k′i is set to 1, otherwise, k
′
i is set to 0. Once the key is retrieved,
she decrypts the ciphertext CT to retrieve the message M . These operations instantiate the Decode(·) function
introduced in Section 2.
4An example of domain names is: softbank126060235192.bbtec.net. Also, one could use existing databases of host names, e.g.,
robtex.com.
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Figure 2: EphPub Key Retrieval.
Note that the message is never transmitted or stored in cleartext, but only in its encrypted form, specifically, in
its “EPO” form. This guarantees that the message M cannot even be retrieved with a forensics analysis on the
hosts after tv. Remark that, after the message validity time tv, the DNS records will be removed from the cache
of the DNS resolvers listed inRs. Thus, the key will “disappear” and the ciphertext can no longer be decrypted.
3.4 EphPub+: Extending EphPub Against a Strong Adversary
In case the EPO is transmitted over a communication channel, the confidentiality of the channel becomes
relevant. Consider the case of the strong adversary presented in Section 2: such an adversary may eavesdrop on
the communication channel, get hold of the EPO before expiration time, and hence retrieve the ephemeral key
and the message M . We extend the EphPub protocol above to be robust even in presence of a strong adversary.
Besides executing the EphPub protocol, the sender super-encrypts the EPO, using, for instance, an asymmetric
encryption scheme, such as PGP, and the receiver’s long term public key. Note that, if there are several receivers,
broadcast encryption techniques [5] can be used to minimize related overhead. In the rest of the paper, we will
refer to EphPub+ as the protocol enforcing super-encryption of the EPO prior to transmission, and we refer to
E(EPO) as the encryption of the EPO.
Remark. One additional potential concern with respect to a strong adversary is related to monitoring (cleartext)
DNS messages between the sender and the cache resolvers. Because of this, queries to the DNS resolver have
to be performed in random order. Thus, assuming 128-bit keys, a strong adversary monitoring a server’s DNS
traffic learns the Hamming weight of the key (i.e. the number of ones), which corresponds to reducing the
entropy of the key by roughly 5 bits5.
If this marginal reduction of the key strength is problematic, slightly increasing the key allows to com-
pensate for it. For example, using a key of 134-bits provides slightly more than 128-bits of security when the
Hamming weight of the key is known to the adversary. Alternatively, the sender can tunnel DNS requests, e.g.,
using Tor [10]. Note that, as a positive side effect, the use of Tor provides higher anonymity, as DNS requests
cannot be correlated to senders.
3.5 Handling Errors and Erasures
Bit errors may occur in the ephemeral key: for instance, if a resolver is re-started while its cache is populated
with one record used by EphPub, the corresponding bit will be decoded as a 0, instead of a 1. A bit can
also flip from 0 to 1 if the corresponding record is requested by another user, after the sender performed key
distribution. Note that the probability of this event is negligible if the domain name is selected at random,
5In average [22], the key search space for a key of size m with known Hamming weight is of
∑n
m=0
(nm)
2
2n
.
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among a virtually unlimited number of host names, e.g., if wild-card domains are used. Finally, erasures occurs
when the corresponding bit cannot be set, for example when a resolver does not reply during key retrieval.
To address potential errors and erasures, we use error correction codes [21], which make data resilient to
a defined number of errors. Specifically, we use Reed-Solomon (RS) codes [27]. We select a (63, 55) RS
code allowing to correct between 8 and 48 erasures or between 4 and 24 errors (depending on where the errors
occur, since symbols are 6 bits long) or a combination of those, within the capacity of the error correction code.
The use of this code in EphPub increases the number of DNS requests only by 20%, e.g., for a 128-bit key,
the increase is from 128 to 176. Note that the receiver needs to fetch the correction bits only when errors or
erasures are present. Our experiments show that the Reed-Solomon code guarantees accurate key decoding
with very limited overhead. If needed, error correction capabilities can be tuned by changing the parameters of
the code, allowing higher reliability or more efficient network usage.
4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security and privacy provided by EphPub. We also discuss several attacks
that may target the EphPub protocol as well as potential issues that might be used to compromise system’s
security.
4.1 Retroactive Privacy in EphPub
Theorem 1. EphPub is a retroactive-private in presence of a weak adversary.
Proof (Intuition). We observe that no efficient weak adversary, W-ADV, targeting an EphPub execution, has
a non-negligible advantage over 1/2 in the game introduced in Section 2. First, remark that, as the weak
adversary does not get any additional information during [t, tv], the only advantage for her may derive from
accessing EPO(Mb, tv), at time τ > tv, i.e., after the EPO has expired. Intuitively, an adversary accessing
an expired EPO retrieves the ciphertext of the target message, the list of DNS cache resolvers with the related
queried domain names. Assuming the underlying encryption scheme is semantically secure, the ciphertext does
not reveal any additional information, unless the corresponding key is retrieved. Recall that EphPub uses the
expiration of DNS cache records to encode the key: this inherent property of DNS resolvers causes significant
challenges to attackers that do no target their attacks prior to data expiration. Indeed, although the EPO still
contains the list of DNS cache resolvers that were used for key storage, these resolvers no longer contain key
information. In fact, even if resolvers are subpoenaed or subject to forensics, related key bits would not be
present in the cache. Thus, after the TTL has passed, attackers cannot learn whether the domain name has ever
been in the cache. Also, observe that, since the receiver erases the encryption key and the message M before
its expiration time, potential compromise of the receiver does not help the attacker.
As a result, the adversary cannot use information obtained from an expired EPO to recover the original
message, thus, EphPub is retroactive-private.
4.2 Retroactive Privacy in EphPub+
Theorem 2. EphPub+ is a retroactive-private in presence of a strong adversary.
Proof (Intuition). We remark that no efficient strong adversary, S-ADV, targeting an EphPub+ execution, has
a non-negligible advantage over 1/2 in the game introduced in Section 2. Recall that S-ADV has access to the
communication between ChS and ChR, as opposed to W-ADV. Thus, the advantage for S-ADV may derive
both from accessingEPO(Mb, Tv) at time τ > t+Tv and from accessing E(EPO(Mb, Tv)) at any time before
t+ Tv. However, one can reduce the retroactive privacy in presence of S-ADV to the security of the encryption
scheme E and the retroactive privacy in presence of W-ADV. Indeed, E(EPO(Mb, Tv)) is a ciphertext produced
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using a secure encryption scheme (as discussed in Section 3.4), hence, it is straightforward to show that, if S-
ADV has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Mb given the knowledge of E(EPO(Mb, Tv)), then
S-ADV can be used to break the security of the underlying encryption scheme. In fact, since the adversary’s
view is again restricted toEPO(Mb, Tv) after expiration time t+Tv, we can use the same arguments of Theorem
1.
4.3 Infeasibility of Key Recovery Attacks
Brute Force Attack. In order to reconstruct an EphPub key, an attacker may attempt to crawl all existing
DNS cache resolvers with DNS requests, and try to identify some bits of the key. However, since the number
of DNS cache resolvers and, especially, that of all possible domain names is extremely large, this approach
is not feasible. Note that, in early 2011, http://www.whois.sc/internet-statistics reported 126
million active registered domain names. Moreover, relying on a sufficiently large set of wild-card domains
would virtually remove any limit.
DNS Infrastructure Infiltration and Sybil Attacks. An additional adversarial strategy could involve infil-
tration in the DNS infrastructure, somehow similar to the Sybil attack, performed against the DHT used by
Vanish [32]. Recall that, in a Sybil attack, an attacker controls several hosts that generate many virtual iden-
tities, hence, she receives a very large portion of the traffic. However, DNS resolvers are uniquely identified
by their IP addresses and do not have virtual identities. A Sybil attack or an infiltration attack on the DNS
infrastructure would require either (i) a very large number of public IP addresses pointing to a few hosts, (ii)
a very large number of hosts acting as DNS resolvers or (iii) compromising or obtaining traffic logs of a large
amount of the DNS resolvers.
We argue that those options are far from being viable. In fact, unless the attacker controls an extremely
significant portion of DNS resolvers used to store the key of the target EPO, the amount of information that the
attacker could learn is very limited. Since resolvers are chosen at random, e.g., among a million servers, an
attacker that compromise a fraction of those would obtain, on average, the same fraction of key bits. That is,
controlling 100K resolvers would lead to recovering only 10% of key bits.
Also note that an attacker cannot use newly deployed resolvers or compromised bots, which are often
unstable and online for a relatively short period of time. In fact, in the design of EphPub, we make sure that
resolvers are picked from a list that is generated and maintained conservatively (see Section 6).
4.4 Denial of Service
We now consider potential DoS attacks against EphPub. We identify two scenarios. In the first one, the
attacker knows the EPO and her goal is to prevent the receiver from recovering the message. In the second
scenario, the attacker is not focusing on a specific target, whereas, her goal is to attack the entire EphPub
service.
Attacking a known EPO. An attacker with access to an EPO has a couple of potential approaches to prevent
decryption. First, all key bits could be flipped to 1 by performing recursive DNS requests of all the EPO domain
names. However, after this attack the records corresponding to bit 0 in the initial key will have a larger TTL than
the records corresponding to bit 1. Therefore, the initial key could still be recoverable by the receiver. Second,
the attacker could target the caches of DNS resolvers, which have finite memory. As a result, an attacker could
launch a DoS to EphPub by filling caches with random entries until the entry used to store a bit is removed
from the cache. However, the default Bind behavior does not limit the cache size, making this attack almost
impossible. For DNS cache resolvers with cache size limitations6 the attack would be feasible at the cost of
a huge number of DNS queries. Finally, the attacker could perform a DoS attack on the DNS cache resolvers
6Note that BIND9 has an option to limit cache size max-cache-size, however it has been reported to be nonfunctional.
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themselves, by flooding them with bogus DNS requests. Note that as for most of Internet protocols, DoS (or
even worse, DDoS) attacks are very difficult to prevent and are in general unrelated to the privacy of the system.
One natural countermeasure is to always enforce EphPub+, i.e., super-encrypting the EPO, so that an attacker
would not have access to the DNS information.
4.5 Traffic to Top Level Domains and Root Servers
When a bit is stored in a DNS cache resolver, the resolver will need to walk the DNS hierarchy to resolve the
hostname’s components it does not currently have in cache. Assuming a completely empty cache, the following
steps will be preformed by the DNS cache resolver to resolve the hostname “sub.domain.tld”:
• A root server Ri, among R1, . . . , Rn, is queried for sub.domain.tld Ri’s will answer the addresses of the
authoritative servers for tld (Top Level Domain servers), e.g., T1, . . . , Tn.
• A TLD server Tj is queried for the record sub.domain.tld. It will answer the list of authoritative servers
for the domain domain.tld, A1, . . . , An
• Finally, an Ak will be queried for the domain sub.domain.tld., and will answer with the requested record
or a negative answer if this record does not exist (or a list of DNS resolvers in case there is further sub
domain delegations).
During the above process, the key might be disclosed to Ri, Tj , even if they are not malicious themselves,
their network traffic might be logged, e.g., for forensics purposes. If an attacker gets access to the logs of all
root and/or all TLD servers involved, she can then retroactively recover the original message from an EPO.
An effective counter-measure is to “pre-fetch” TLD and domain records, independently of the value of the
bit to store, by performing a recursive query for an arbitrary record of the same domain, e.g., www.domain.tld.
This will force the cache resolver to obtain the records for tld and domain.tld. Therefore, this will only exposes
a hostname independent of the hostname actually used to store EphPub bits. Also, the information received by
root and TLD servers is the same, independently of the value actually stored in the DNS cache. Our prototype
implements “pre-fetching” by default, this has a moderate impact on the performance and overall network load,
as it performs requests independently of the value of the bit to store.
4.6 Irrelevance of Known DNS Security Issues
DNS Flushing Periods. Older versions of the BIND DNS Server do not periodically erase expired entries
from the DNS cache. Therefore, a forensic analysis could allow to recover the entries (i.e., key bits), after
their normal expiration date. This analysis would reveal parts of a key that should not otherwise be available.
Fortunately, only BIND versions older than 4.9 lack a regular cache cleanup [2]. In our experiments, there were
only 4 out of 90K resolvers which were fingerprinted as using BIND versions before 4.9, thus, we excluded
them. More recent BIND versions define a 1-hour default cleaning interval. Expired entries encoding the key
bits are therefore removed from the cache with at most one hour delay.
DNS Poisoning Attack. The DNS system has been the target of well-known attacks, such as DNS cache
poisoning [19]. In such an attack, an attacker is able to inject a fake record associating a legitimate host name
to a bogus IP address. This attack is used for redirecting users to a malicious site. Variants of this attack rely
on injecting fraudulent glue records together with normal response [31] in order to redirect queries to malicious
resolvers. This attack does not interfere with EphPub as long as records can be cached by resolvers, even if the
stored values point to malicious IP addresses.
Domain Name System Security Extensions. DNSSEC have been recently designed to provide authentication
and data integrity of DNS records [12]. The main idea of DNSSEC is to digitally sign answers to DNS lookups
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using public-key cryptography. EphPub is not affected by the deployment of DNSSEC since these extensions
do not impact the DNS caching mechanisms EphPub is built on.
DNS Proxying. A few enterprise networks and ISPs implement transparent DNS proxying [4] to reduce band-
width overhead. While not recommended, DNS transparent proxying forces a sender to use the DNS resolver
chosen by the ISP. The DNS proxy intercepts any incoming DNS request and redirect them to the configured
resolver. As a result, a sender cannot select the DNS resolver to resolve her request and, therefore, EphPub
cannot operate. A similar problem arises when full packet capture and storage is performed within a close
network distance to the sender or receiver. In this case, captured packets, together with the EPO, can result into
recovering the message. However, these problems can be addressed by tunneling EphPub’s DNS requests, e.g.,
using Tor [10].
5 The EphPub Prototype
We have implemented an EphPub prototype with a simple modular architecture made of two components:
the “DNS core” (backend) and the user interface (frontend). In this section, we present the details of the
components and the interface between them, as well as the description of our software implementations – the
source code of our implementations is available at http://code.google.com/p/ephpub/.
Backend. The crucial component in EphPub is the software layer responsible for performing DNS queries to
distribute/retrieve key bits. In the EphPub prototype, this layer has been implemented in Python, enhanced by
the open-source PyDNS module (http://pydns.sourceforge.net) for DNS queries. Given the simplicity
of DNS queries, EphPub can easily be ported to any other system/architecture. To distribute ephemeral keys,
EphPub uses randomly picked DNS cache resolvers and domain names. The implementation of key storage is
straightforward, by means of recursive and non-recursive DNS queries. As a result, the footprint of our core
implementation is extremely compact. Encryption is done with AES, relying on the PyCrypto python module
(http://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto) and 128-bit keys.
Frontend. Given the simple structure of our Python-based core, the development of the user interface is not
limited by particular assumptions that may affect portability or usability. Besides a simple command-line tool
for ephemeral files, we developed a Firefox anf Thunderbird extension prototype, using the python support
provided by the pyxpcomext extension (http://pyxpcomext.mozdev.org). Therefore, all DNS operations
are performed from within the extension. This extension allows: (1) the sender to encrypt any web content using
EphPub and publish the corresponding EPO, (2) the receiver to open an EPO and decrypt the corresponding
information (as long as that expiration time is not passed).
Usability. The EphPub functionality is completely included in a stand-alone Firefox and Thunderbird exten-
sion, i.e., we do not require the user to install or launch any additional background software, as opposed to Van-
ish [17]. We believe that this is crucial in order to improve the usability of the solution. Specifically, the Vanish
Firefox extension requires an underlying DHT backend (i.e., Vuze) that needs to be launched independently.
This also involves potentially “invasive” operations, such as the installation of the Java Virtual Machine. In
contrast, our prototype only requires installing the Firefox or Thunderbird extension, thus, it addresses a larger
variety of potential users and devices.
Availability. Our prototype does not incur a setup delay, as opposed to Vanish, where the use of the extension
is subject to the Vuze backend to bootstrap. This can take 5-10 minutes according to [17], and it may increase,
as we have experienced, depending on local network configuration. Furthermore, we stress that P2P-based
solutions may be prevented by firewalls and network filters, whereas, EphPub uses simple DNS queries, which
are unlikely to be firewalled.
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6 Measurements & Experiments
We now overview our measurements, performed over several months, to select DNS cache resolvers, and
present our experimental analysis of EphPub’s efficiency and robustness.
6.1 DNS Cache Resolvers
EphPub uses a set of randomly chosen DNS cache resolvers to distribute encryption keys. Thus, the related
software layer must be equipped with an appropriate list. Although EphPub addresses potential errors and
failures using error correcting codes, we need to assess DNS resolvers’ reliability to minimize error rate. To
this end, we build a list containing the highest possible ratio of resolvers that: (i) successfully respond to both
recursive and non-recursive queries, (ii) have a small rate of connection errors, (iii) maintain entries in the
cache for the entire TTL time and not longer. Since an accurate list of such resolvers would evolve over time,
we design EphPub to mirror this evolution by providing users with automatic periodical updates.
We now overview our methodology. We remark that it might be worth investigating how to maintain an
optimal dataset, e.g., drawing from existing studies, such as [7, 20, 30].
Initial DNS Resolvers Dataset. We started from a list of 900K IP addresses responding to DNS queries,
from a previous probing performed several months earlier. We re-probed these addresses and obtained a list
of ∼225K active IP addresses. We validated this list by verifying whether the addresses answered to DNS
queries throughout a period of 2 months and filtered those addresses that: (i) did not answer to recursive DNS
queries, (ii) did not cache answers to recursive queries, (iii) did not answer to non-recursive DNS queries, (iv)
performed caching or recursive resolution when receiving non-recursive queries. This way, we built a dataset
of ∼130K DNS cache resolvers.
TTL Compliance. Next, we focused on selecting cache resolvers that register the correct TTL. Indeed, looking
at the TTL of the resolution answer returned after a recursive query, we noticed that some resolvers ignore the
domains’ TTL, as already pointed out by [7]. After a 4-week observation, we reduced our dataset to ∼80K
resolvers to exclude misbehaving resolvers. Finally, we made sure that DNS cache resolvers used by EphPub
would successfully maintain cache entries for the intended time, i.e., domain’s TTL. Hence, we periodically
performed recursive DNS queries and subsequently test the presence of the corresponding cache entry with
non-recursive queries. Following a conservative strategy, we discarded resolvers that generated failures or
premature cache entry removals after an observation time of 4 weeks. As a result, our final dataset includes
∼25K reliable resolvers. We summarize our measurements in Table 1.
Experiment Dataset Fail Pass
Initial dataset 900K 675K 225K
Correctly perform cache 225K 95K 130K
Cache correct TTL 130K 50K 80K
Cache persistence 90K 65K 25K
Table 1: Building a dataset of reliable DNS cache resolvers.
6.2 Domain Names
One of our requirements is to let users actively and accurately control message expiration time. In EphPub,
this time is related to key expiration time, thus, to the cache entries’ TTL. To this end, EphPub performs
recursive queries only on domains that have the desired TTL. Recall that the set of domains is generated at
random, as described in Section 3.3. Although the RFC1912 [3] defines the TTL to potentially last up to
several weeks, in practice, we find that only a negligible fraction of domains have TTL higher than 604, 800
seconds (1 week). We highlight that the range of possible TTLs a user can select is reasonably wide. To confirm
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this, we generated 2 million random domains that could be successfully resolved (i.e., we generated a random
IP address and performed a reverse lookup to obtain the corresponding domain name). Then, we harvested
their TTL provided by the authoritative DNS server. We notice that TTLs range from 0 seconds to 7 days. The
distribution of most frequent TTLs is shown in Table 2. As a result, our current techniques limit expiration
time to 1 week. In many cases such a lifetime is enough for the application we consider (e.g., the Online
Social Networks scenario in Section 1). Also, note that this is a significantly larger interval than prior work:
in Vanish [17], key shares are deleted after (typically) 8 hours, due to DHT churn. However, we acknowledge
that it is an interesting open challenge how to support even longer expiration times, e.g., by periodically (and
automatically) re-initializing ephemeral keys.7
TTL domains TTL domains
1200 [20m] 13,595 86400 [24h] 998,450
1800 [30m] 7,269 172800 [2days] 77,326
3600 [1h] 201,789 259200 [3days] 12,317
7200 [2h] 171,685 432000 [5days] 13,450
43200 [12h] 180,144 604800 [7days] 42,142
Table 2: Number of most frequent occurrences of TTLs over 2 million random domains.
6.3 EphPub Robustness
We now evaluate the robustness of EphPub system: we test distribution and retrieval of EphPub keys. Our
goal is to examine whether the keys can be successfully retrieved before the expiration time while disappearing
afterwards.
To this end, we executed the EphPub protocol introduced in Section 3.3. We fixed the encryption key size
to 128 bits and chose a desired expiration time, i.e., 24 hours and 7 days. We stored the key as follows. First, we
encode the key using the Reed-Solomon code discussed in Section 3.5, obtaining a 176-bit encoding, denoted
with e1, · · · , e176. Next, for each ei, we wrote ei on the randomly picked cache resolver resi using the domain
name di chosen at random and having a TTL equal to the desired expiration time. Then, at periodic intervals,
we retrieved the keys from the cache resolvers. For each (resi, di), we performed a non-recursive DNS query
to cache resolver resi for the domain di: if an entry in the cache existed, we read e′i = 1, otherwise e
′
i = 0.
Finally, we decoded the key using the Reed-Solomon decoding.
We now analyze the percentage of key bits successfully retrieved during our experiments. We measured the
correctness of both:
1. The bits that were read/written on cache resolvers, i.e., whether e′i = ei.
2. The key bits effectively used for encryption/decryption, after applying error correction code.
Figure 3 presents the results of our experiments (averaged over 100 trials). Keys could be correctly retrieved
up to the expiration time, whereas right after TTL timeout all bit 1’s flip to 0 in the corresponding key. At this
point, the recovered key is all 0’s (it reads on Figure 3 as around 50% of the initial random key bits, which were
initially 0’s, are correctly recovered). Clearly, this provides no information on the original key.
One potential concern regarding EphPub’s robustness may be related to its resilience to errors due to colli-
sions in writing ephemeral bits. However, one can make collision nearly impossible using wild-cards. Nonethe-
less, one can estimate the probability of a collision (without using wild-cards), using the birthday problem.
Specifically, we model the probability of having at least one collision as p(n; d) = 1 − e−n(n−1)/2d, where n
is the number of EphPub documents with same expiration time and generated within the same time frame, and
7In cases where longer lifetimes are needed, it is possible (although not very efficient) for the source of the content to extend the
expiration time of the DNS entries, by refreshing the cache after expiration, or to create a new EPO and distribute the new EPO to
users.
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Figure 3: Percentage of EphPub key bits correctly recovered with expiration times, respectively, 24 hours (a)
and 7 days (b). Before expiration time, key bits are correctly recovered. After expiration time, key bits 1 (on
average 50% of key bits) flip to 0 and are no longer correctly recovered. Whereas, key bits 0 (the other 50%
of key bits) conserve their value. The resulting key is a dummy sequence of 0’s and can no longer be used for
valid decryption. Note that lines are plotted as the interpolation over periodical key retrievals.
d is the product between the size of cache resolvers’ dataset (i.e., 25K in our experiments) and the number of
domain names with the specific TTL. For instance, considering documents with 24-hour expiration time, using
our dataset of 25K cache resolvers and 1M random domains with 24-hour TTL, and assuming n=10K, we
obtain p(n; d) ≈ 10−3. Also, recall that our error correction code can correct between 4 and 24 errors (see
Section 3.5). These numbers correspond to a small to medium deployment. Scaling to a larger number of
users would require more DNS servers8 and the use of wildcard DNS domains to completely avoid the birthday
paradox problem.
We conclude that the EphPub prototype is robust and accurate enough for real-world deployment. Nonethe-
less, a more accurate and extensive profiling of the DNS cache resolvers may further reduce the percentage of
bit flipping.
6.4 Performance Evaluation
We now analyze the performance of EphPub to confirm that our approach is fast enough to be used in
practice. In addition, we discuss several ideas to optimize our implementation. Measurements are done on a
Dell PC with two quad-core CPUs Intel Xeon at 1.60GHz with 4GB RAM, Python 2.6.2 (with pydns-2.3.3 and
pycrypto-2.1.0b1) and a high-speed Internet connection.
Key Distribution. The main operations involved in distributing EphPub keys are the generation of valid random
domains with intended TTL and DNS (non) recursive queries. (We do not consider cryptographic operations,
since symmetric key encryption is relatively fast compared to the former tasks). Random domain generation is
performed as follows: we generate random IP address and perform a reverse lookup on the local DNS resolver
to check whether the corresponding domain name resolves and has the desired TTL. Hence, this operation
involves a number of trials that is directly related to the popularity of the desired expiration time as domain
TTL. Due to its limited overhead, it is possible to execute multiple instances of this operation in parallel.
However, as described in Section 3.3, the random domain generation is performed ahead of time, and not online.
Nonetheless, we measure the overhead that users would experience if they want to independently generate the
domains at run-time. Due to potential errors or failures, it is advisable to pre-generate a number of random
domains strictly larger—e.g., twice as many— than the bits to store. In order to generate 320 random domains
(that is almost twice the number of bits to store, when using 128-bit encryption keys and Reed-Solomon codes),
8Based on work from Dagon et. al. [7] we estimate that 1,7 million DNS servers on the Internet would be suitable
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our prototype requires around 5s for TTL equal to 86,400 seconds (1 day). We also measure times for less
popular TTLs. To generate the same number of random domains but with TTL equal to 14,400 seconds (4
hours), the prototype requires around 1 minute.
On the other hand, the time overhead needed to store key bits in DNS caches mostly depends on the delay
in executing recursive queries. Our experiments show that, executing queries in parallel (instantiating up to 64
threads), this operation takes about 6 seconds. Although, DNS queries are not computationally expensive (in
our experiments, the CPU usage never went over 2% throughout the whole execution) we let the number of
parallel threads be a parameter that can be set by the user according to its needs.
Key Retrieval. Time to retrieve the key bits from DNS caches depends on the the delay of executing non-
recursive queries, which is much smaller compared to recursive queries. In our experiments, it takes only about
1s to retrieve 176 key bits.
Additional DNS traffic. One possible objection to the EphPub system could be that it generates additional
traffic towards DNS resolvers. However, the generated traffic is extremely limited in comparison to the number
of DNS queries generated through typical web navigation. To illustrate this, we note as examples that opening
the Firefox default homepage on Ubuntu leads to more than 50 DNS queries. Furthermore, opening the www.
cnn.com web page generates about 140 DNS queries. The number of queries is related to several factors,
such as pre-fetching performed by Firefox, the number of advertisement links, and multiple lookups for each
domain (one for each domain in the search list [1], IPv6 and IPv4 requests, etc.). When compared to these very
common actions, the network and DNS usage of EphPub can be considered negligible. Moreover, performing
those DNS requests in parallel (up to 64 parallel threads in our experiments) might appear as an aggressive
behavior. However, each DNS cache resolver used will receive at most two DNS requests, which is a negligible
workload. Also, the generated network traffic is quite limited: we measured that storing/retrieving a key on
the resolvers generates at most 32KB of DNS traffic, corresponding to the worst case of having all bits set to 1
(given that an average request/response amounts to 180 bytes).
Message Overhead. The information contained in EPOs naturally generates a message overhead. Indeed,
beyond the ciphertext, assuming the use of a 128-bit key and the Reed-Solomon error correction technique (see
Section 3.5), the EPO contains 176 IP addresses for the DNS cache resolvers (each requiring 4 bytes) and 176
domain names (each requiring approximately 20 bytes). Thus, we estimate the average size of the additional
information in the EPO at 4KB. According to the measurement work presented in [18], this overhead would be
equal to less than one tenth of the average email size – approximately 60KB. Nonetheless, as this information
is textual, the use of compression algorithms would remarkably reduce related overhead.
7 Related Work
Forward Secret Privacy. Forward Secret Privacy (PFS) [9] is the property ensuring that a session key derived
from a pair of long-term public and private keys will not be compromised, if one of the long-term private
keys is compromised in the future. An authenticated Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol provides this
property since the compromise of the long term key does not provide any information about the DH components
that were used. However, a PFS system does not guarantee retroactive privacy. In fact, messages are not time-
bounded, hence, the receiver or any party obtaining the key can always decrypt messages without any restriction
of time.
Ephemerizer. The introduction of a trusted third party for erasing data on behalf of users has been proposed by
Ephemerizer solutions [24, 25, 26, 29]. Users delegate deletion of protected content to third parties (dedicated
servers) that destroy the data or the encryption keys after a specified timeout. Again, this violates one of our
main goals, i.e., to avoid the introduction of one or more trustworthy, always-on, and centralized services that
might be compromised. For instance, recall the case of the Hushmail email encryption service, which was
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secretly providing the cleartext content of encrypted messages to the U.S. government [28].
Vanish. Similar to Vanish [17], EphPub aims at providing retroactive privacy, even if data storage is not
trusted, compromised or stolen. However, as discussed in Section 1, the Vanish architecture is vulnerable to
Sybil attacks [32]. Authors of Vanish have proposed countermeasures to this specific attack [16]. However, as
discussed in [32], this has only raised the bar for the attacker, due to the vulnerability of DHTs to Sybil attack,
thus, leaving as open question whether or not DHTs are the best choice for key-share storage.
Observe that the main flaw of Vanish design is that DHTs are assumed to be resistant to crawling. On
the contrary, monitoring all DNS resolvers is realistically infeasible. Further, EphPub provides several im-
provements in terms of robustness and usability. First, it allows users to select the expiration time: by choosing
domain names matching desired lifetime period, users assign their content a more precise expiration time (while
in Vanish this is assigned by the specific DHT implementation and due to network churn, unless using a so-
called “refreshing proxy” that re-pushes key shares). Also, as we show next, given its simple nature, EphPub
does not require users to install any additional software (e.g., DHT client). Thus, it can be easily ported on any
architecture and deployed even on mobile phones. Indeed, researchers are already advocating efficient solutions
to guarantee retroactive privacy, for instance, in location sharing applications over smartphones [15].
8 Conclusion & Future Work
This paper formalized the concept of Ephemeral Publishing (EphPub) and presented a novel efficient and
robust solution to it, based on the caching mechanism of the DNS. It is transparent to existing applications and
services and lets the sender to control data’s lifetime with relatively finer granularity than prior work [17]. Our
EphPub technique uses a Reed-Solomon error correction code to minimize the error ratio. Our experimental
analysis attests to EphPub’s efficiency and shows that the protocol correctly handles ephemeral keys. Mea-
surements conducted over several hundred thousands open DNS resolvers may be of independent interest. We
estimated the number of resolvers suitable for EphPub to 1.7 million.
We also proposed a command-line tool and a Firefox and a Thunderbird extension prototypes that imple-
ment EphPub. Our software improves, by design, the usability of previous work [17]. Our implementations use
a list of selected DNS cache resolvers that minimize error rates. Nonetheless, EphPub users can build their own
set of random resolvers.
EphPub guarantees that published content cannot be decoded after its expiration time, i.e., after that, an
adversary cannot retrieve the decryption key, hence, she cannot reconstruct the content. Note that this guarantee
holds even if the adversary controls (or compromises) the sender and the receivers, and tries to recover the key
or the plaintext from their memory. Indeed, we assume that senders (resp., receivers) never store plaintexts and
encryption/decryption keys, after publishing (resp., reading) the content, and before the expiration time. While
one may consider this to be a “strong” assumption, observe that EphPub’s retroactive privacy guarantees are
useful even without this assumption. In fact, EphPub ensures that expired content cannot be retrieved by the
types of attackers (similar to honest-but-curious adversaries), envisioned in EphPub applications. For instance,
recall the examples from Section 1: even if plaintexts are not erased by the publisher, an employer is still
prevented from crawling social networks, blogs and forums, or cached data to access expired content published
by his employees.
We emphasize that EphPub does not protect against a user that copies or redistributes decrypted content,
although the EphPub software is designed not to store it on local memory.
EphPub represents an initial foray into DNS-based Ephemeral Publishing, thus, much remains to be done.
Future work includes a deeper analysis of existing DNS monitoring systems, a large-scale evaluation on the
DNS load, and investigating alternative approaches based on other caching mechanisms of today’s Internet
(e.g., web caching).
We also acknowledge that, if EphPub was to be used by a high number (e.g., millions) of users, it could
impose a remarkable and unwanted traffic on the (open) DNS cache resolvers. Thus, it is unclear how resolvers’
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administrators will react. Nevertheless, we hope that the privacy protection offered by systems like EphPub
will result into a community effort, where users may contribute by providing DNS resources. One prominent
example of this practice is the Tor Project [10], where a volunteer network of servers route Internet traffic in
order to conceal a user’s location or web usage.
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